SQE practice questions with answers

Answer: D. An ordinary resolution to authorise the sale of the storehouse.

Option A: This is false as the delivery truck purchase doesn't require authorisation by the shareholders due to its value and it's the marketing director who is selling it, not the finance director.

Option B: The logistics director's involvement in the sale of the storehouse is irrelevant to the resolutions required, hence this resolution is not needed.

Option C: While the sale of the storehouse needs to be authorised with an ordinary resolution, the purchase of the delivery truck doesn't require authorisation by the shareholders due to its value.

Option D: Correct. The sale of the storehouse is a substantial property transaction and therefore needs to be authorised by the shareholders through an ordinary resolution under s 190.

Option E: This is false as the delivery truck purchase doesn't require authorisation by the shareholders due to its value.

Answer: D. The court must take into account that it is likely the breach of duty will be ratified.

Option A is false because the size of the managing director's shareholding is not a deciding factor in a derivative claim as per s260(1) CA06.

Option B is incorrect because the court's duty is not to dismiss the claim due to likely ratification but it must consider it as per s263(3)(d) CA06.

Option C is false because the lack of support from other shareholders does not prevent a shareholder from bringing a derivative claim according to s260(1) CA06.

Option D is correct. The court should consider whether the act is likely to be ratified by the company according to s263(3)(d) CA06.

Option E is false because the support of the board members for the managing director does not directly influence the outcome of a derivative claim according to s263(2)(c)(i) CA06 and s175(4)-(6) CA06.

Answer: C. Yes, because the partner failed to personally notify the bookstore of her departure.

Option A is false because the bookstore was entitled to actual notice of her departure.

Option B is false because there are exceptions to the rule that partners are not liable for debts after the departure, such as when third parties have not been given appropriate notice.

Option C is true because the bookstore did not receive actual notice of the partner’s departure from the firm and was therefore entitled to treat her as a continuing partner.

Option D is false because an indemnity agreement between partners doesn't overrule the liability of partners to third parties.

Option E is false because the partner's request for her name removal from firm’s stationery did not hold out or knowingly allow herself to be held out as a partner in the firm.

Answer: C. Yes, as a CEO with the expected general knowledge, skill and experience, she should not have signed the insurance form without reviewing it.

Option A is false because the client has a duty of oversight, and this includes reviewing documents before signing them.

Option B is false because, despite delegation being common, the CEO should review critical documents to avoid such errors.

Option C is true. The client, given her role, should have exercised due care by reviewing the form before signing it.

Option D is false. While understanding the risk profile is important, the key issue here is the CEO not reviewing the document before signing.

Option E is false. Even if the broker had a professional duty, the CEO should have reviewed the document to ensure accuracy.

Answer: E. The sole proprietor could use carry across/carry back relief to reduce total income in this tax year and the tax year before the year of loss and then carry the remaining loss forward against first subsequent profits from the same trade.

Option A is false because Capital allowance relief is used for expenditures on assets and not for trading losses.

Option B is false because trading losses cannot be used as tax credits against future personal income tax.

Option C is false because trading losses cannot be used to offset against future capital gains.

Option D is incorrect because, when using start up relief, the loss must be set against earlier years first and then later years. One cannot choose which year’s income is reduced first. It is also not possible to set the loss against less than the full three years (so far as the loss can be used).

Option E is correct because the sole proprietor can use carry across relief to reduce total income to zero and do the same in the tax year before the tax year of loss. This will use up £45,000 of the loss. The sole proprietor can then carry the remaining loss forward and use it to reduce first subsequent profits of the same trade, which are projected to be £50,000.

Answer: C. No, start-up loss relief only allows him to offset his trading losses against his total income for the three years immediately before the loss, beginning with the earlier years.

Option A: This option is wrong. Start-up loss relief does not provide the flexibility to offset losses against income in the next fiscal year.

Option B: This option is incorrect because it wrongly suggests that the taxpayer can offset their loss against their total income in the first year of business, while in reality, start-up loss relief permits offsetting losses against total income in the preceding three years.

Option C: This is the correct option. Start-up loss relief only allows a taxpayer to carry a trading loss back and set it off against their total income in the three years immediately prior to the loss, starting with the earliest year first.

Option D: This option is incorrect. Start-up loss relief does not allow for the offset of losses against income from the past 5 years. The losses can only be offset against income in the three years preceding the loss.

Option E: This option, although it refers to offsetting the loss against total income for the three following years, inaccurately mentions the offset starts with the most recent year. The offset should start with the earliest year first.

Answer: D. Yes, because the defendant did not serve a written notice to withdraw or change the terms of the first offer.

Option A is false because the making of a second offer does not impact the validity of the first offer (Gibbon v Manchester City Council).

Option B is false because explicit statement of voidance is not the only way to withdraw an offer. The defendant can also withdraw it by serving a written notice of withdrawal or change.

Option C is false because decrease in the claimant's case strength does not affect validity of the original offer.

Option D is correct. A Part 36 offer remains open for acceptance by the offeree until the offeror withdraws it by serving a written notice of withdrawal or changes its terms by serving a written notice of change (CPR 36.9(2)-(3)).

Option E is false because time elapsed does not invalidate the offer unless a written notice of withdrawal or change is served (CPR 36.9(2)-(3)).

Answer: A. The client's order letter should be placed in Part 3 of the client's list of documents.

Option A: Correct answer. The disputed quantity of the furniture order is a key point of contention, and the order letter could support either party’s stance on this matter. The document thus satisfies the criteria for standard disclosure and should be disclosed. Part 3 of the list pertains to documents known to exist but no longer under control of the party, making it the suitable section for this document.

Option B: Incorrect. Part 4 is not a valid part of the list of documents. The order letter, not being in the client's control, belongs in Part 3.

Option C: Incorrect. The order letter needs to be part of the standard disclosure process and should be included in the client's list of documents, specifically in Part 3.

Option D: Incorrect. The lawyer's personal documentation is not relevant here. The order letter, not being in the client's control, should be included in the client's list of documents, specifically in Part 3.

Option E: Incorrect. Part 1 is for those documents within the party's control and available for inspection by the opposing party. The order letter is no longer within the client's control and thus should be listed in Part 3.

Answer: D. The principle of qualified one-way costs shifting suggests that the client will not be required to pay the defendant’s costs.

Option A: This option is false because the application of qualified one-way costs shifting is not determined by the financial status of the claimant.

Option B: This option is incorrect. The principle of qualified one way costs shifting ensures that the claimant will not be asked to pay the defendant’s costs, not the other way around.

Option C: This option is false because qualified one-way costs shifting can apply to any personal injury claim, including work-related injuries.

Option D: This is the correct answer. Qualified one-way costs shifting protects the claimant from having to pay the defendant's costs.

Option E: This option is false because the application of qualified one-way costs shifting is not determined by the employment status of the claimant.

Answer: C. Yes, the 'takeover' exception applies where the transferee gains over 50% of the voting shares.

Option A is false because the 'takeover' exception is not about a change in leadership, but about changes in voting shares ownership.

Option B is false because the fact that the son already owns shares is relevant, as it contributes to the total voting shares held after the transfer, but it does not negate the application of the 'takeover' exclusion.

Option C is correct. In this case, the 'takeover' exclusion applies because the number of voting shares being acquired are added to those already held by the son. He would therefore own 55% of the voting shares after the acquisition.

Option D is wrong. The 'takeover' exclusion applies to the specified activity of advising, arranging and dealing as an agent. It does not only apply to mergers and acquisitions.

Option E is wrong. The 'takeover' exclusion extends beyond transfers of shares between family members and third parties and can apply (for instance) to transfers of shares from one single individual to another.

Answer: C. Refuse to act because the solicitor does not have enough verification of the client's identity.

Option A is false because confirmation of full name and address from non-authentic sources is not considered sufficient verification.

Option B is false because waiting for another document doesn't reduce the risk of potential illicit activities.

Option C is true because the solicitor should refuse to act in these circumstances due to lack of sufficient verification of the client's identity from an independent, reliable source.

Option D is false because a large cash payment increases the risk of money laundering.

Option E is false because a credit history check cannot replace the need for official identification verification.

Answer: D. Yes, because the lawyer proceeded with the share acquisition without the necessary consent.

Option A: This is false because even though the lawyer might not have prior knowledge about the client's tax evasion, they are still liable under s 328 as they proceeded with the share acquisition without the necessary consent.

Option B: This is false because although the lawyer was not the one to file the suspicious activity report, they still needed proper consent to proceed with the transaction.

Option C: This is false because under s 328, suspicion is all that is required. Hence, whether the client's activities were proven to be fraudulent or not is irrelevant.

Option D: This is true. Despite making an authorised disclosure, the lawyer would still need consent to proceed with the share acquisition in order to avoid committing the offence under s 328.

Option E: The responsibility to file a suspicious activity report lies with the appointed officer. The lawyer's liability under s 328 is not dependent on the filing of this report.

Answer: D. The cost of the new tablet, the lost income from the interrupted lesson, and the lost income from the 10 cancelled lessons.

Option A is false because it omits the lost income from the 10 cancelled lessons which is a recoverable loss in negligence.

Option B is false because the cost of replacing the defective flask cannot be recovered in negligence.

Option C is false because the cost of replacing the defective flask is not recoverable in negligence.

Option D is true because all losses listed here are consequential economic losses that are recoverable in negligence. The cost of replacing the flask is not included because this is pure economic loss which isn't recoverable in negligence.

Option E is false because the cost of replacing the defective flask cannot be recovered in negligence.

Answer: A. The man will win, but his damages are likely to be reduced by 15% on the grounds of contributory negligence.

Option A is true because the man’s failure to wear a seat belt which would have reduced his injuries leads to a reduction in damages on the grounds of contributory negligence. The established reduction in such cases is typically 15% as per Froom v Butcher [1975] 3 All ER 520.

Option B is false because the man’s failure to adhere to safety guidelines doesn't negate the friend’s negligence in driving.

Option C is false because while it's beneficial to ensure passengers adhere to safety measures, not doing so doesn't necessarily make the friend legally responsible for the man’s harm.

Option D is false because while the friend's negligence caused the accident, the man's injury severity was influenced by his decision not to wear a seat belt, thus likely leading to a reduction in damages.

Option E is false because the damages are typically reduced by 25% only in cases where the injuries would have been entirely prevented had the claimant worn a seat belt, as per the guidelines established in Froom v Butcher.

Answer: A. The man's future loss of earnings will initially be calculated based on his net annual salary and the number of years until his projected retirement.

Option A is true because the computation of future loss of earnings begins with the man's annual net salary and the number of years until his projected retirement.

Option B is false because the man's potential future promotions must be factored into the calculation of his future loss of earnings.

Option C is false because the man's insurance payout is not considered when calculating damages.

Option D is false because the man's pre-trial loss of earnings are classified as special damages, not punitive damages.

Option E is false because 'Lost years' are not taken into account as the man's future life expectancy has not been affected by his injury.

Answer: A. Yes, because the client has suffered purely economic loss and the manufacturer is not obliged to them under a duty of care. If they sue the manufacturer their claim will most likely be unsuccessful.

Option A is true because the client's loss is characterised as pure economic loss which is protected under the general rule that there is no duty of care owed for such loss. There is no exception that applies in this case, so the client should accept the manufacturer's offer.

Option B is false because the manufacturer's duty of care only covers physical damage and personal injury, not pure economic loss. Additionally, a mere admission of fault does not automatically obligate the manufacturer to replace the entire system free of charge.

Option C is false because although avoiding business disruption is a valid concern, it does not directly influence the legal aspects of the case. The main reason for accepting the offer is the nature of the client's loss, not the potential duration of legal proceedings.

Option D is false because the client's contract was with the retail company, not the manufacturer. Thus, they do not have an implied warranty claim against the manufacturer.

Option E is false because there are no facts suggesting the existence of a special relationship that would assume a responsibility from the manufacturer to the client.

Answer: C. The restaurant can obtain damages for the rental of the standard refrigerator and for the loss of profits suffered, including the loss of normal profits, but not for the loss of the lucrative catering contract.

Option A: This answer is incorrect. The rental cost of the standard refrigerator is an expected consequence of the breach and is, therefore, recoverable.

Option B: This answer is incorrect. The rental cost and the loss of normal profits, as a foreseeable consequence of the breach, are recoverable even if the supplier was unaware of the other commitments.

Option C: This answer is correct. The rental cost and the loss of normal profits are foreseeable consequences of the breach and therefore recoverable. The supplier was not aware of the special circumstances related to the lucrative catering contract, so this loss is unlikely to be recoverable.

Option D: This answer is incorrect. Alongside the rental cost, the loss of normal profits, as a foreseeable consequence of the breach, is also recoverable.

Option E: This answer is incorrect. The supplier was not aware of the lucrative catering contract, so this loss is unlikely to be recoverable.

Answer: D. No, because although the Term is an innominate term, and there has been a severe breach of contract, the restaurant owner affirmed the contract by continuing to use the oven after repairs. Affirmation is a bar to contract termination.

Option A: This answer is false because the Term is not a mere representation but an innominate term, and the restaurant owner affirmed the contract by repairing and continuing to use the oven, which bars contract termination.

Option B: This answer is false. The Term is not a fundamental term but an innominate term, and the restaurant owner affirmed the contract by repairing and continuing to use the oven, which bars contract termination.

Option C: This answer is incorrect. The term is not an implied term; it's an innominate term, and the restaurant owner affirmed the contract by repairing and continuing to use the oven, which bars contract termination.

Option D: This answer is correct. The term is an innominate term, and there has indeed been a severe breach. However, by repairing and continuing to use the oven, the restaurant owner affirmed the contract, which prevents contract termination.

Option E: This answer is incorrect. The term is not a condition but an innominate term, and the restaurant owner affirmed the contract by repairing and continuing to use the oven, which bars contract termination.

Answer: C. The firm could be held liable but if sued, damages claimed will be limited to the contract's price if the exemption clause is fair.

Option A is false because the exemption clause in the contract restricts the firm's liability to the contract's price.

Option B is false because the firm can be held liable for the actions of their employees.

Option C is true. The Unfair Contract Terms Act subjects the exemption clause to a test of reasonableness. If found reasonable, it will limit the firm’s liability as per the contract.

Option D is false. Paying for the service does not prevent the restaurant owner from seeking redress if the work is substandard.

Option E is false. It is possible to limit or exclude liability for negligence, but clear language is required. Here, the clause specifically refers to ‘negligence’.

Answer: D. Damages for breach of contract in the estimated sum of £500.

Option A is false because the court would not reduce the original contract price as the plumber did not complete the job as agreed in the contract.

Option B is false because the court would not order the plumber to compensate for all additional expenses as these are not directly related to the breach of contract.

Option C is false because the court would not order specific performance for a contract involving personal services.

Option D is true. Contract damages aim to place the innocent party in the same position as if the contract had been properly performed. If the contract had been properly performed, the bathroom would have been fixed at a cost of £3,000. The woman can still get the job completed on time at a total cost of £3,500 (£1,000 paid to the plumber and £2,500 paid to the other plumber). Therefore, her damages would be £500.

Option E is false. The court may order a wrongdoer to hand over all profits flowing from a breach of contract but only in truly exceptional cases. Here, a breach of a simple consumer contract giving rise to clear financial loss for breach makes the award of conventional damages the most appropriate remedy.

Answer: A. No, because the agreement to pay the extra £20,000 was obtained by duress which makes the variation voidable.

Option A is true. The restaurant's agreement was obtained by the chef's illegal threat to abandon the project. This amounts to duress which makes the variation voidable.

Option B is false as the chef's financial difficulties do not obligate the restaurant to agree to a change in contract terms.

Option C is false because the increase in ingredient prices does not factor into the legality of the agreement to pay the extra £20,000.

Option D is false. While the restaurant needed a new menu, this does not make them legally obligated to pay the additional amount.

Option E is false because the chef did complete the work by the agreed deadline.

Answer: D. The judge has distinguished the case of Dawson from the current case, as there were key differences in the facts of the case.

Option A: This is incorrect because the judge is not interpreting the decision but differentiating the Dawson case from the current case.

Option B: This is incorrect because while the judge is differentiating the case, it's not due to her fundamental disagreement with the reasoning.

Option C: This is incorrect because the judge is referencing the Dawson case as relevant, but differentiating it from the current case.

Option D: This is correct. The Crown Court would be bound by decisions made in the Court of Appeal and the judge sought to highlight the differences in the facts of the two cases to justify her decision to uphold the appeal.

Option E: This is incorrect because the judge did not express disagreement with the Dawson decision, nor was it made in a lower court.

Answer: A. As the Royal prerogative and statute conflict, the government's decision will have no impact as the statute prevails.

Option A: This is the correct answer. In instances where the Royal prerogative power conflicts with statute, the statute will prevail. The government cannot undermine a statute using its prerogative powers.

Option B: This is incorrect. The decision is not contingent on Parliamentary approval. In fact, if there's a conflict, the statute prevails over the prerogative.

Option C: This is not correct. The airline can challenge the government's decision and does not need approval from any government to do so.

Option D: This is incorrect. The courts do not automatically defer to the Royal prerogative, especially in cases where it conflicts with statute.

Option E: This is incorrect. While prerogative decisions were once considered non-justiciable, changes in jurisprudence (Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374) make them justiciable in most circumstances, including this one.

Answer: C. No, because the UK Parliament is supreme and the Sewel Convention is not legally enforceable.

Option A is false because, although the UK Parliament likely violated the Sewel Convention in passing the Act without the Welsh Parliament's approval, the principle of parliamentary supremacy means that it can disregard constitutional conventions as they are not legally enforceable.

Option B is false because the Sewel Convention doesn't require the UK Parliament to seek the consent of the Welsh Government but the Welsh Parliament itself. Also, the UK Parliament has the supreme authority to legislate on any matter.

Option C is true. The Sewel Convention remains legally unenforceable, even though it is codified in statute (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5).

Option D is false because it's not enough to simply claim that the Act violates rights of the Welsh people. Also, the UK Parliament has the supreme authority to legislate even in contradiction to Convention rights.

Option E is false because healthcare is indeed a devolved matter and the UK Parliament would generally require the consent of the Welsh Parliament to legislate on such matters. However, the principle of parliamentary supremacy means the UK Parliament can legislate on any matter, even those devolved to the Welsh Parliament, without its consent.

Answer: D. Yes, because penalties should only be imposed for a violation of the law that was previously established before a court of law.

Option A is incorrect. While the rule of law is a crucial part of the UK constitution, it doesn't mean Parliament can't pass legislation that goes against it due to the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty.

Option B is false because the Bill does not seek to maintain the separation of powers which is a fundamental aspect of the rule of law.

Option C is false. The rule of law is not simply subject to alteration by legislative powers and requires careful consideration and adherence.

Option D is correct. It echoes Dicey's first principle of the rule of law and the universally accepted notion of a fair trial before a court of law being a vital element of the rule of law.

Option E is false. The mere discussion or passing of a Bill through Parliament does not automatically mean it aligns with the rule of law.

Answer: D. A quashing order.

Option A: This answer is incorrect because although a declaration order might clarify the legal position, it's not enforceable and compensation is not available for infringement of a public law right.

Option B: This answer is incorrect because the council doesn't need to be prohibited from any action.

Option C: This answer is incorrect because there's no need to restrain the council from taking any action and a quashing order alone is sufficient.

Option D: This answer is correct. CCR should seek a quashing order to nullify the unlawful decision of the council. The decision would then be sent back to the local council for reconsideration in light of the court's ruling.

Option E: This answer is incorrect because the council indeed considered the application before rejecting it and damages are not a suitable remedy in this case.

Answer: E. The construction of the waste treatment plant, while in the public interest, is a disproportionate interference with the man’s right to a private life.

Option A is false because even though the act may allow the construction, the infringement on the right to private life must also be proportionate and in this case, there are more suitable sites for the plant away from residential areas.

Option B is false because it is likely that the man’s Article 8 right (right to a private life) is being breached here despite the legality under the Pollution Control Act.

Option C is false because the construction of the plant does have a legal basis - the Pollution Control Act 2017. However, its proximity to residential areas makes it a disproportionate interference with the man's right to a private life.

Option D is false because while the construction of the plant does engage the man's right to a private life, given there are more suitable sites away from residential areas, the interference is not proportionate.

Option E is true because the construction is in public interest and has a legal basis, but it appears there are more suitable sites for the plant, away from residential areas, making the interference with the man’s right to a private life disproportionate.

Answer: E. The PRs are protected against possible claims by unknown creditors but not against possible claims by the childhood acquaintance and the partner.

Option A: This is incorrect because while the PRs have adhered to s27 Trustee Act 1925, it only protects them against claims from unknown creditors, not from known but untraceable beneficiaries or potential claims from the partner.

Option B: This is incorrect. The PRs have complied with s27 Trustee Act 1925, which offers protection against claims from unknown creditors, not from the partner or the childhood acquaintance.

Option C: This is incorrect. The PRs are protected against unknown creditors due to adherence to s27 Trustee Act 1925, not against the childhood acquaintance or potential claims from the partner.

Option D: This is incorrect. The PRs do not have protection against claims by the childhood acquaintance, as the s27 Trustee Act 1925 does not cover known but untraceable beneficiaries. Moreover, they are not protected against potential claims by the partner under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

Option E: This is correct. The PRs have complied with s27 Trustee Act 1925, which offers protection against claims from unknown creditors. However, it doesn't cover known but untraceable beneficiaries such as the childhood acquaintance. The PRs are not protected against claims under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, as they distributed the estate within six months from the grant.

Answer: D. The PRs will be liable to pay CGT on the sale of the shares as the shares have increased in value from the date of death to the date of disposal.

Option A: This option is incorrect. Although inheritance is often tax-free, the PRs do have a responsibility to pay CGT on any taxable disposals during the period of administration.

Option B: This option is incorrect. The transfer of the painting does not result in any charge to CGT, as no chargeable gain is generated – the son is considered to have acquired the asset at its probate value (£15,000).

Option C: This option is incorrect. The PRs are not liable to pay CGT based on the initial cost of these assets but rather on the increase in value during the period of administration.

Option D: This option is correct. The PRs disposed of the shares, which led to a chargeable gain (considering the value at death as the acquisition value).

Option E: This option is incorrect. The transfer of the painting does not trigger any charge to CGT, and the two disposals do not need to be aggregated.

Answer: B. The daughter and the granddaughter will share the balance of the estate.

Option A is false because the brother does not automatically gain possession of the vintage car due to the sister's death. The gift of the car has lapsed because of the sister's death before the man.

Option B is true due to S.33 Wills Act 1837. As the son predeceased the testator but left an issue, his daughter, the gift does not lapse but instead passes to the beneficiary’s issue.

Option C is false because the properties were sold and their value transferred to the man's savings account prior to his death. As a result, the gift of properties to the brother has adeemed.

Option D is false because the remainder of the estate will be shared between the daughter and the granddaughter, not the wife.

Option E is false because the granddaughter, being the issue of a predeceased son, is entitled to her father's share of the estate.

Answer: C. Yes, because the trustees breached the trust and the grandchildren are within the time limit to bring a claim against them.

Option A is false because trustees typically have the right to advance capital unless specifically prohibited by the trust deed. In this case, the issue is not about the legal right to advance capital but about advancing capital to the wrong beneficiary.

Option B is false because a beneficiary's claim against a trust does not depend on whether they have financially contributed to the trust. The claim would be based on the terms of the trust and any breaches of trust by the trustees.

Option C is true. The trustees wrongfully advanced capital to the husband, a life tenant who had no entitlement to capital. This constituted a breach of trust. The six-year limitation period for bringing claims for breach of trust starts upon the death of the life tenant. Therefore, the grandchildren is still within time to bring their claim.

Option D is false. While trustees have discretion in managing the trust, they must always act in the best interest of all beneficiaries, not just the husband. By advancing capital to the husband, they breached the trust.

Option E is false. The grandchildren were not required to bring the claim at the time of the advancement. The six-year limitation period only starts to run upon the death of the life tenant, so they are still within time to bring their claim.

Answer: C. A one-third interest in the boat and all of the sculpture.

Option A is false because it does not accurately represent the proportionate interest of the inheritance trust in the boat, neither does it accurately apply Clayton's Case.

Option B is false because it does not accurately reflect the proportionate interest of the inheritance trust in the boat and sculpture.

Option C is true because the boat, purchased using funds from both trusts, grants a proportionate interest to the beneficiaries of the inheritance trust, regardless of its depreciation in value. The sculpture, representing a withdrawal from the mixed bank account, is allocated to the inheritance trust based on Clayton's Case and FIFO rules.

Option D is false because it disregards the possibility of claiming an interest in the boat, which does not represent the best available outcome for the inheritance trust.

Option E is false because it does not provide a fair distribution of the assets bought with the mixed funds.

Answer: D. The husband and the son.

Option A: This is false because the son is already of legal age and capable to give consent. His legal representative's consent is not required.

Option B: This is false because Alzheimer's Research UK has no beneficial interest under the trust as the son has satisfied the contingency, hence their consent is not necessary.

Option C: This is false because the decision on whether to terminate the trust is exclusively for the beneficiaries, not the trustees.

Option D: This is correct. The son’s beneficial interest was contingent on him reaching 21 years, which he has. Therefore, his remainder interest has vested. If the son were to die before the husband, the son’s beneficial interest would transfer under the terms of his will or intestacy. At present, therefore, the husband and son can use the rule in Saunders v Vautier to end the trust. They are, between them, absolutely entitled to the trust fund.

Option E: This is false because the court's consent is not necessary to terminate the trust. The consent of the beneficiaries, in this case, the husband and the son, are sufficient.

Answer: D. The son should have been paid income generated from the trust over the last two years.

Option A is false because the trust deed specifies that the son is to receive the fund on his 25th birthday, not based on his university expenses.

Option B is false because although the son is an adult, the trust deed states that the fund should be given to him when he turns 25.

Option C is false because the aunt's approval does not affect the son's entitlement to the trust fund as per the trust deed.

Option D is true. Under s 31 of the TA 1925, the son is entitled to income as an adult and a contingent beneficiary.

Option E is false. The number of beneficiaries is irrelevant to the trustees' obligation to pay the son income.

Answer: B. The architect holds 25% as a tenant in common while the designer and the mathematician, collectively, hold the remaining 75% as joint tenants.

Option A: This is incorrect because the architect did not reduce his stake to 10% and the engineer's brother does not inherit his share due to the rule of survivorship in joint tenancy.

Option B: This correctly reflects the current holding. The mortgage taken out by the architect severed his joint tenancy, causing him to hold 25% as a tenant in common. The designer and mathematician continue to hold the remaining 75% as joint tenants, with the engineer's share having been absorbed by them due to the rule of survivorship.

Option C: This is incorrect because the architect did not increase his stake to 50%, and the engineer's brother does not inherit his share due to the rule of survivorship in joint tenancy.

Option D: This is incorrect. The engineer's brother does not inherit his share due to the rule of survivorship in joint tenancy.

Option E: This is incorrect. The engineer's brother does not inherit his share due to the rule of survivorship in joint tenancy. Also, the proportion of the architect, designer, and mathematician's shares are not accurately represented.

Answer: E. The family firm cannot sue the constructor directly but can sue the industrialist for damages and this might lead to indirect enforcement against the constructor.

Option A is false because the burden of the covenant has not passed to the constructor directly.

Option B is false because there is no direct contractual relationship between the family firm and the constructor.

Option C is false because although there is a notice of the covenant on the Charges Register, this does not pass the burden of a positive covenant to a successor to the original covenantor.

Option D is false because the burden of the covenant has not passed to the constructor directly. Additionally, an injunction is a remedy relevant to the enforcement of restrictive, rather than a positive covenant.

Option E is true because the burden of a positive covenant cannot pass directly to a successor but the original covenantor remains liable. The family firm can sue the industrialist for this breach and because the constructor agreed to an indemnity covenant with the industrialist, the industrialist will claim under that indemnity if it is successfully sued by the family firm. This could motivate the constructor to repair the wall.

Answer: C. The lease is a legal lease because its creation meets the conditions required to create a parol lease.

Option A is false because the landlord allowing immediate possession does not necessarily make the lease legal. The conditions required to validly create a parol lease under s54(2) LPA 1925 must be met.

Option B is false because the term being shorter than the maximum period for a statutory lease does not make it a legal lease. The conditions required to validly create a parol lease under s54(2) LPA 1925 must be met.

Option C is true because the lease was created for a term not exceeding three years, took effect in possession, the shopkeeper is paying what is effectively a market rent and did not pay a premium to take the lease. These are the conditions required to validly create a parol lease under s54(2) LPA 1925.

Option D is false because the regular payment of rent by the shopkeeper does not make the lease an equitable lease. The requirements of section 2 LP(MP)A 1989 for the creation of an equitable lease need to be met, which are not satisfied in this case.

Option E is false because immediate possession by the shopkeeper does not make the lease an equitable lease. The requirements of section 2 LP(MP)A 1989 for the creation of an equitable lease need to be met, which are not satisfied in this case.

Answer: D. The buyer will be bound by the restrictive covenant if it is noted in the Charges Register of the title and he may also be bound by any trust interest which the seller’s aunt has in the property even if there is no entry on the register in respect of it.

Option A: This is false because the buyer will be bound by the restrictive covenant only if it is noted in the Charges Register of the title.

Option B: This is false because the nature of the covenant matters; only restrictive covenants can bind successors. Also, the aunt's trust interest may be overriding and bind even if not registered.

Option C: This is false because the buyer will be bound by the restrictive covenant only if it is noted in the Charges Register of the title. A trust interest may bind even if not registered.

Option D: This accurately describes the buyer's potential obligations. The covenant is restrictive and can bind successors if noted in the Charges Register. The aunt's trust interest may be overriding and bind even if not registered.

Option E: The trust interest may be overriding and bind even if not registered.

Answer: A. The first lessee and the present lessee.

Option A is correct. Since the lease was established before 1 January 1996, there is privity of contract between the freehold company and the first lessee. There is also privity of estate between the freehold company and the present lessee. Therefore, the freehold company can sue both the first lessee and the present lessee.

Option B is false. The first and the second lessee are not both liable because there is no privity of contract or estate between the freehold company and the second lessee.

Option C is false. The freehold company cannot sue all apartment owners because only the first lessee and the present lessee are involved in this lease agreement.

Option D is false because there is no privity of contract or estate between the freehold company and the second lessee.

Option E is incorrect. While the freehold company can sue the present lessee, this answer disregards the first lessee, who can also be a party to the proceedings.

Answer: E. Serve a notice to the sub-tenant to direct future rent payments under the sub-lease to the property owner.

Option A: This option is not ideal as it would result in an empty building, and the property owner has stated that current rental market conditions are weak.

Option B: This option is not feasible as it is a reactive measure and the property owner is already facing issues with the tenant's financial struggles.

Option C: This option is not feasible as the former tenant has been liquidated; hence, enforcing the rent payment under the AGA won't be possible.

Option D: This option would be inappropriate for rent arrears, and the new tenant's financial struggles would likely prevent them from complying with a court order.

Option E: This is the most suitable option. Under Section 81 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the property owner can serve a notice on the sub-tenant to divert future rent payments directly to them, effective after 14 clear days, until the arrears are cleared.

Answer: E. Vacant possession should be secured because the landlord can offer alternative accommodation which is suitable to the tenant’s needs and on reasonable terms.

Option A: This is incorrect because the type of business the landlord intends to run in the premises is not relevant to the ground (d) - alternative accommodation.

Option B: This is not correct because the duration of the freehold ownership is not directly relevant to the ground (d) - alternative accommodation.

Option C: This is incorrect. The tenant's right of renewal can be overridden if the landlord can offer alternative accommodation suitable to the tenant’s needs and on reasonable terms (ground d).

Option D: This is incorrect because although ground (d) is a mandatory ground, no compensation is payable if the ground is made out.

Option E: This is the best answer. The Landlord can use ground (d) – alternative accommodation – provided that the alternative accommodation is suitable to the tenant’s needs and on reasonable terms, which appears to be the case on the facts.

Answer: D. Provided the tenant requests consent in writing, the landlord must give consent for the assignment unless it is reasonable not to do so.

Option A is false because the lease explicitly states that the tenant may not sublet the Premises.

Option B is false because acting as a guarantor would not satisfy the tenant's wish to sell the lease.

Option C is false because the landlord can refuse the assignment if it is reasonable to do so, for instance, if the proposed assignee is not financially strong.

Option D is correct. The Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, s19(1)(a) implies into any qualified covenant that it be subject to a proviso that such consent is not to be unreasonably withheld. If the tenant requests consent in writing, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, s1 states that the landlord must give consent within a reasonable time, except in cases where it is reasonable not to do so.

Option E is false because while the law does imply a proviso that the landlord’s consent will not be unreasonably withheld, the landlord can still withhold consent where it is reasonable to do so, e.g., if the proposed assignee is not financially strong.

Answer: B. Yes, because the Client, being the original covenantor, will always be responsible for any future breach of the covenant in the Charges Register.

Option A is false because the sale of the house does not automatically eliminate existing covenants.

Option B is true because the Client, as the original covenantor, remains liable for breaches of the covenant and would want the buyer to adhere to the covenant and indemnify him against any future breach.

Option C is false because the covenant does not cease to exist once the house is sold; the Client would still remain liable for any breach.

Option D is false because the client cannot unilaterally refuse to be held liable for the covenant after the sale.

Option E is false because an indemnity covenant does not automatically free the original covenantor from their obligations but provides some protection as the buyer promises to observe the covenant and indemnify the Client if they are sued for a breach.

Answer: C. Serve a notice to complete immediately. If the buyer does not comply with the notice, then forfeit the deposit, re-sell the boutique and claim damages.

Option A: This is not the best option as court orders for specific performance are rarely granted in such situations and can lead to lengthy legal proceedings.

Option B: This option is false because it's unlikely that the buyer, who already lacks funds, would agree to immediate completion.

Option C: This is the best option as it allows the client to get more funds (the deposit) quicker to spend on the renovation. Furthermore, given the buoyant property market, the chances of finding another buyer are high.

Option D: This option is false because it's not within the seller's rights to dictate how the buyer should acquire the necessary funds.

Option E: This is false because the seller needs the funds urgently. A payment plan would not provide the necessary funds promptly.

Answer: E. Accomplice to inflicting grievous bodily harm.

Option A: This is not correct. An accessory after the fact is someone who assists another who has committed a crime after the crime has been committed. The woman was involved before and during the crime, not after.

Option B: This is incorrect as the woman did not physically harm the victim, therefore she cannot be classified as a principal party to causing grievous bodily harm.

Option C: This is incorrect because an innocent agent is someone who is unknowingly used by another to carry out a crime. The woman was aware of the crime being committed, hence she cannot be classified as an innocent agent.

Option D: This option is incorrect. The woman was involved in planning the assault, despite not causing the injuries herself, hence she still bears some legal responsibility for the victim's injuries.

Option E: This is the correct answer. Although the woman intended for a less severe harm to occur, she knowingly assisted in a crime. This makes her an accomplice and she is thus liable for her own level of mens rea, even though it differs from the principal's.

Answer: C. The girl is liable as she foresees a risk of damage to the pen, but the boy cannot be liable as the bag is his.

Option A: This is incorrect because the boy cannot be liable for damaging his own property, and while the girl did cause damage, she did not have the direct intent to do so.

Option B: This is incorrect because the girl was reckless as she understood the risk of causing damage, making her liable. The boy is indeed not liable since he cannot be guilty of simple criminal damage to his own property.

Option C: This is correct. The girl damages property belonging to another and she foresees the risk of causing damage. The boy cannot be guilty of simple criminal damage where the property in question belongs to him.

Option D: This is incorrect. While the girl is indeed liable, the boy cannot be held accountable for damaging his own property, even due to negligence.

Option E: This is incorrect. While the girl did have mens rea, the boy cannot be liable for damaging his own property, making them not equally liable.

Answer: A. The gardener has the mens rea of recklessness because he foresaw that there was a risk his actions would damage the car and he went on to take the risk anyway.

Option A: This is correct. The gardener acknowledged there was a risk of damaging the car but chose to proceed, despite having an opportunity to avoid the risk. The gardener's actions, therefore, constitute recklessness as defined in R v Cunningham/R v G.

Option B: This is false. Negligence implies a failure to consider the potential harm, whereas the gardener did acknowledge there was a risk, which is regarded as recklessness.

Option C: This is false. The gardener's intention was to damage his own property, not someone else's. The intent cannot be transferred from his property to another's.

Option D: This is false. Failing to ask the neighbour to move the car does not establish an intent or recklessness towards damaging the car.

Option E: This is false. The mens rea for criminal damage can be formed through either intent or recklessness. The fact that the gardener didn't intend to cause damage doesn't mean he lacks the mens rea for the offence entirely.

Answer: C. The woman is liable as she has embarked on the crime proper.

Option A is false because even though she didn't succeed in setting a fire, she is still culpable because she embarked on the crime proper.

Option B is false because the type of cloth isn't a decisive factor in determining the actus reus of attempted arson; the woman's actions still constitute an attempt.

Option C is true because according to R v Gullefer [1987], a defendant must have embarked on the crime proper to be guilty of an attempt.

Option D is false because the intention to cause harm is part of the mens rea, not the actus reus of the crime.

Option E is false because the legality of the parking is not relevant to the actus reus of the attempted arson.

Answer: A. The judge will consider the identification evidence of low quality and direct the jury to acquit the defendant at the conclusion of the prosecution's case.

Option A: This is the correct answer. Given the identification evidence is of poor quality and there's no other supporting evidence from the prosecution, the judge should stop the trial at the end of the prosecution's case and direct the jury to acquit the defendant.

Option B: This is incorrect. The judge cannot instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, he can only assess its quality and direct them appropriately.

Option C: This is incorrect. The legality of the identification procedure does not automatically make the evidence reliable, especially considering the poor visibility and brief sighting by the bouncer.

Option D: This is incorrect. The judge's role includes assessing the quality of the evidence and guiding the jury, not leaving them to make decisions based on poor quality evidence.

Option E: This is incorrect. A Turnbull warning is only given when the evidence is either good, or, is poor but supported, neither of which applies here.

Answer: D. The client should respond 'no comment' to all questions and instead submit a written statement explaining his version of events.

Option A: This is not the best advice as the client has indicated that he becomes confused under pressure and may therefore unintentionally incriminate himself.

Option B: This advice is incorrect as it doesn't address the client's anxiety and tendency to become confused. Furthermore, outright denial may not be the best strategy if there is evidence against him.

Option C: This is not a good advice because it could potentially incriminate the client, especially if there's proof that the books are from the stolen collection.

Option D: This is the best advice. Given the client's nervousness and tendency to become confused, it would be safer to present his explanation in a written statement at the start of the interview. This will help prevent inferences being drawn under s34 CJPOA 1994, if later he presents this evidence at trial.

Option E: This is not a good advice as it contradicts the client's statement about being out for lunch during his shift on the day the books were reported missing. Admitting to being at the crime scene could potentially incriminate him.

Answer: A. There are substantial reasons to believe that the client will not report to custody.

Option A is correct because the defendant has a history of not reporting to custody and lacks stable community ties, evident from his lack of permanent residence.

Option B is false because there is no evidence presented that the client has the means or intention to flee the country while on bail.

Option C is false because there is no past evidence that he has committed violent offences while on bail.

Option D is false because a claim of self-defence is not a ground for bail refusal, and it is not related to the risk of not appearing at court or committing further offences.

Option E is false because these factors are not grounds for refusing bail by themselves.

Answer: A. Yes, because the delay has been authorised by an officer of at least the rank of inspector and the man has been arrested for an indictable offence.

Option A: This option is correct. According to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 56, the police can delay notifying another person about a suspect's arrest for up to 36 hours if the suspect has been arrested for an indictable offence. Robbery is an indictable offence and the delay has been authorised by an officer of rank equal or greater than inspector.

Option B: This option is incorrect. The approval can be given by any officer of the rank of inspector or higher, regardless of their involvement in the case.

Option C: This option is incorrect. The very membership in a gang doesn't provide lawful justification for delaying the man's right to notify. The delay is permitted only if the person has been arrested for an indictable offence, and the approval has been given by an officer of the rank of inspector or higher.

Option D: This option is incorrect. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows delays of up to 36 hours to be authorised.

Option E: This option is incorrect. The type of offence does matter. The power to delay notification only applies to indictable offences, and robbery is one such offence.

Answer: A. The lawyer must cease representing the client, but he cannot disclose the reason to the court or prosecution.

Option A: This is the correct answer. Continuing to represent the client in this case would equate to knowingly misleading the court now that the lawyer is aware of the client’s real identity. However, the lawyer has a duty of confidentiality and must not disclose the reason for his withdrawal to the court or prosecution.

Option B: This option is false because it would violate the lawyer's duty of confidentiality towards his client.

Option C: This option is false. The lawyer can't force the client to reveal her true identity, and he can't continue representing her without misleading the court.

Option D: This option is false because it would violate the lawyer's duty of confidentiality towards his client.

Option E: This answer is incorrect because although the lawyer has a duty to act in the client’s best interests, this obligation does not supersede his duty to the court to not knowingly mislead it.