1,000+ Free SQE1 Sample Questions MCQ [2026 Updated List]

Answer: B. A "battle of the forms" is resolved by orthodox offer and acceptance analysis: Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401. The quotation was an offer on the seller's terms. The buyer's purchase order, being on materially different terms, was not an acceptance but a counter-offer, which destroyed the original offer (Hyde v Wrench (1840)). When the seller signed and returned the acknowledgment slip expressly accepting the order "on the terms and conditions stated thereon", it accepted the buyer's counter-offer, concluding a contract on the buyer's terms. In Butler itself, on materially identical facts, the majority held that the covering letter referring back to the quotation merely identified the machine and the quoted price and was not effective to reintroduce the seller's conditions. In practice the party who fires the "last shot" that is then accepted (by signature or by conduct) usually wins — but here the last operative shot was the buyer's order, which the seller accepted. The price variation clause was therefore not incorporated and the additional £4,300 is irrecoverable.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the covering letter was not a fresh counter-offer: on Butler Machine Tool reasoning it merely identified the machine and price and did not override the express acceptance on the slip. C is wrong because a contract clearly was concluded — offer (the buyer's order) met acceptance (the returned slip) — so there is no room for a quantum meruit. D is wrong because a statement that one party's terms "shall prevail" cannot bind the other party in advance; an offer, however emphatic, is destroyed by a counter-offer. E is wrong because the buyer's terms were incorporated through the seller's acceptance; the SGA 1979 reasonable-price provision applies only where no price is agreed, whereas here the buyer's order fixed the price.

Answer: B. Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides that where a person has entered a contract after a misrepresentation made by the other party and has suffered loss, the misrepresentor is liable in damages as if the representation had been made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe, and did believe up to the time the contract was made, that the facts represented were true. This reversed burden of proof is the claim's decisive advantage: the buyer need only prove a false statement of existing fact and inducement; she need not prove dishonesty or even carelessness (Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v A Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd [1978] QB 574). On these facts the owner, who ignored eighteen months of till records sitting in his own office, is most unlikely to discharge that burden. Because of the statutory "fiction of fraud", damages are assessed on the tort of deceit measure, covering all losses flowing directly from the transaction even if unforeseeable (Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297). Damages under s 2(1) are available as of right and do not require rescission, so she can keep the business.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because deceit requires proof of the absence of honest belief (Derry v Peek (1889)), which is precisely the evidential burden she wants to avoid and which the facts (honest belief) suggest she could not discharge. C is wrong because although a Hedley Byrne claim may exist in principle, it places the burden of proving a duty and breach on her, making it clearly inferior where s 2(1) is available between contracting parties. D is wrong because the representation is not "innocent" for the purposes of the Act merely because belief was honest — the owner must also show reasonable grounds for that belief, which he lacks. E is wrong because a statement made in negotiations is prima facie a representation, not a contractual term, so expectation damages measured as if the statement were true are not available.

Answer: C. Under section 1(1)(a) of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984, any duty to a trespasser arises only in respect of injury "by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on them". In Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46, on closely comparable facts, the House of Lords held that a claimant who dived into shallow open water was injured not by the state of the premises — there was nothing unusual or hidden about the lake — but by his own decision to engage in an activity carrying an inherent and obvious risk. No duty therefore arose under the 1984 Act, and the same analysis would defeat a claim even by a lawful visitor under the 1957 Act. Lord Hoffmann emphasised that occupiers are not required to protect adults of full capacity against obvious risks they freely choose to run, and that the social value of access to open land weighs against requiring destructive or costly deterrent measures. The company's knowledge of swimmers and its unimplemented planting scheme are irrelevant if the threshold requirement of a danger due to the state of the premises is never crossed. The claim fails at the duty stage.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the section 1(3) conditions only become relevant once there is a danger due to the state of the premises; here there was none, so knowledge of trespassers and of the risk cannot generate a duty. B is wrong because although signs can discharge a duty under section 1(5), the claim fails at the prior stage — no duty ever arose — so the signs are not the operative reason. D is wrong because mere knowledge of, and failure to prevent, repeated trespass does not without more convert trespassers into implied licensees, particularly where fencing and prohibitory signs make the occupier's objection clear. E is wrong because contributory negligence only reduces damages where liability is first established; here there is no breach of any duty to apportion.

Answer: C. An employer is vicariously liable for an employee's tort where the wrongful conduct is so closely connected with acts the employee was authorised to do that it may fairly and properly be regarded as done while acting in the ordinary course of employment (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366). In Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677, the Supreme Court held an employer liable for a kiosk attendant's unprovoked assault on a customer: dealing with customers was within the employee's "field of activities", and the assault formed an unbroken sequence of events flowing from that interaction. The same analysis applies here. Dealing with recipients at the doorstep, including fielding complaints about deliveries, was the very task the driver was employed to perform; the violence erupted directly out of a dispute about the performance of that task, without any break in the chain. This is to be contrasted with WM Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2020] AC 989, where the employee's wrongdoing pursued a personal vendetta wholly disconnected from his assigned functions. Here the driver's anger was itself generated by, and directed at, the delivery interaction, so the close connection test is satisfied.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because since Lister v Hesley Hall it has been settled that even serious intentional criminal wrongdoing can attract vicarious liability if the close connection test is met. B is wrong because the driver's anger arose out of and was inseparable from the delivery interaction itself; this was not the pursuit of a pre-existing private vendetta unconnected with his job, as in the 2020 Morrison case. D is wrong because it conflates vicarious liability, which is strict and requires no fault by the employer, with primary liability in negligence. E is wrong because merely providing the opportunity for wrongdoing, or profiting from the employee's work, is not sufficient — the 2020 Morrison decision confirms that a close connection with authorised activities, not opportunity or deep pockets, is the touchstone.

Answer: B. Under s 168(1) Companies Act 2006, a company may remove a director before the expiry of their period of office by ordinary resolution at a meeting, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between the company and the director. Special notice of the resolution is required (s 168(2)), meaning notice of the intention to move it must be given to the company at least 28 days before the meeting (s 312). Crucially, s 288(2)(a) expressly excludes a s 168 removal resolution from the written resolution procedure, so the solicitor's suggested shortcut is unavailable — a general meeting must actually be held. The director also has statutory protections under s 169: the right to receive a copy of the special notice, to make written representations which the company must circulate, and to be heard on the resolution at the meeting. The removal, once passed, is effective despite the service contract, but s 168(5) preserves Deepa's right to compensation or damages for breach of that contract.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because s 288(2)(a) CA 2006 expressly prohibits using the written resolution procedure for a s 168 removal resolution, however large the majority. C is wrong because removal requires only an ordinary resolution (simple majority of votes cast), not a special resolution. D is wrong because neither s 168 nor the Model Articles gives the board any power to remove a fellow director from office. E is wrong because s 168(1) permits removal notwithstanding any service contract; the removal is valid and Deepa's remedy is a claim for compensation or damages under s 168(5), not invalidation of the resolution.

Answer: B. Under s 36(1) Partnership Act 1890, where a person deals with a firm after a change in its constitution, they are entitled to treat all apparent members of the old firm as still being members until they have notice of the change. Section 36(2) provides that an advertisement in the London Gazette is sufficient notice only as regards persons who had no dealings with the firm before the change. A person who did deal with the firm before the change — an existing customer or supplier such as Greenway Mills Ltd — must be given actual notice of the retirement before the retiring partner escapes liability for new debts. Here, Greenway had traded with the firm for years, received no actual notice, and had no knowledge of the retirement, so Rufus remained an apparent member as regards Greenway and is liable for the May debt. The practical lesson is that retiring partners should ensure actual notification of all existing customers and suppliers, in addition to the Gazette advertisement covering future counterparties.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because Gazette notice is effective only against persons with no prior dealings; it does not protect Rufus against an established supplier. C is wrong because it states the holding-out test in s 14, which is not needed here — s 36 makes an apparent former partner liable to old customers without actual notice, regardless of any representation he permitted. D is wrong because retirement does not transfer or extinguish liability; under s 17(2)-(3) a retiring partner is released from existing and future exposure to a creditor only by agreement (novation) with that creditor. E is wrong because an indemnity in the partnership agreement operates only between the partners internally and cannot affect a creditor's rights against Rufus.

Answer: B. Under CPR 36.17(1)(b), the enhanced claimant consequences are triggered where judgment against the defendant is at least as advantageous to the claimant as the proposals in its own Part 36 offer. The award of £180,000 beats the £160,000 offer, so CPR 36.17(4) applies: unless the court considers it unjust, it must order (a) interest on the sum awarded at up to 10% above base rate for some or all of the period starting when the relevant period expired; (b) costs on the indemnity basis from that same date; (c) interest on those costs at up to 10% above base rate; and (d) an additional amount of 10% of the first £500,000 of the sum awarded (capped at £75,000) — here 10% of £180,000, i.e. £18,000. Costs incurred before expiry of the relevant period are assessed on the standard basis in the ordinary way. Note that the multi-track allocation matters: CPR 36.17 is expressly subject to CPR 36.24, so in a fast track or intermediate track claim within the fixed recoverable costs regime the indemnity-costs consequence is replaced by an uplift of 35% on the difference between the fixed costs applicable at expiry of the relevant period and those applicable at judgment. Because this claim is on the multi-track, the full CPR 36.17(4) package applies, and the judge has already found nothing making those consequences unjust.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because an unaccepted Part 36 offer does not lapse into irrelevance; it is precisely the mechanism that triggers the 36.17(4) consequences at judgment. C is wrong on both points: the consequences run from expiry of the relevant period, not the date of the offer, and the additional amount is a percentage of the sum awarded, not of costs. D is wrong because there is no requirement to prove unreasonable refusal; the consequences follow automatically unless the court considers them unjust under CPR 36.17(5). E is wrong because indemnity costs apply only from expiry of the relevant period, not from issue, and 'double interest' is not a Part 36 remedy — the enhancement is a rate of up to 10% above base.

Answer: B. Under CPR 12.3(1), judgment in default of acknowledgment of service may be obtained only if, at the date judgment is entered, the defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service and the relevant time for doing so has expired. Here the defendant filed its acknowledgment on day 13 — within the 14-day period allowed by CPR 10.3 — and before judgment was entered. The conditions in CPR 12.3 were therefore never satisfied and the judgment was wrongly entered. That engages CPR 13.2, under which the court must set aside a default judgment wrongly entered: setting aside is mandatory, not discretionary. The factors that dominate applications under CPR 13.3 — whether the defence has a real prospect of success, whether there is some other good reason, and the promptness of the application — simply do not arise where the judgment is irregular. The defendant's six-week delay and thin draft defence are accordingly irrelevant; the judgment falls to be set aside as of right.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because it applies the discretionary CPR 13.3 framework to a judgment that was wrongly entered, where CPR 13.2 leaves the court no discretion. C is wrong for the same reason: the real prospect/other good reason test and the promptness factor govern only regularly entered judgments under CPR 13.3. D is wrong because the proper route to challenge a default judgment is an application to set aside under CPR Part 13, not an appeal. E is wrong because there is no 14-day time limit for a set-aside application; promptness is merely a factor under CPR 13.3 and is irrelevant to a mandatory set-aside under CPR 13.2.

Answer: B. A public body exercising a statutory discretion may lawfully adopt a policy to guide that discretion, but it must not apply the policy so rigidly that it shuts its ears to an applicant with something new to say: British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610. Refusing even to consider an application, on the stated basis that the policy 'admits of no exceptions', is a classic fetter on discretion. Fettering of discretion falls within the ground of illegality in Lord Diplock's classification in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, because the decision-maker has failed to exercise the discretion Parliament conferred on it. Here the officer returned the application unread despite detailed exceptional circumstances, so the council never genuinely exercised its discretion at all. That is the strongest and most clearly arguable ground; the challenge does not depend on showing the policy itself is unlawful, only that it was applied inflexibly.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the policy itself is not so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could adopt it — Wednesbury irrationality sets a very high threshold and budget-driven eligibility criteria will usually survive it. C is wrong because fairness in this context does not require an oral hearing for a discretionary grant application; at most it requires the application to be considered. D is wrong because a legitimate expectation requires a clear and unambiguous promise or an established practice, and merely applying for a discretionary benefit generates no expectation of success. E is wrong because proportionality is not a free-standing ground of domestic judicial review outside human rights and (formerly) EU law contexts; the courts have declined to adopt it generally.

Answer: B. The Court of Appeal is generally bound by its own previous decisions, subject to the three exceptions established in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718: (1) where there are two conflicting Court of Appeal decisions, it may choose which to follow; (2) where a previous Court of Appeal decision, though not expressly overruled, cannot stand with a subsequent decision of the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court), it must follow the later, higher decision; and (3) where the previous decision was given per incuriam. The appellant's argument engages the second exception directly: if the reasoning of the 2021 Supreme Court decision is inconsistent with the 2015 Court of Appeal decision, the Court of Appeal is entitled — indeed required — to treat its earlier decision as impliedly overruled and to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning. Express overruling is not required. Option B therefore best describes the position, correctly identifying that implicit inconsistency with a later Supreme Court authority releases the Court of Appeal from its own precedent.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because express overruling is not required — inconsistency with a later Supreme Court decision is one of the recognised Young v Bristol Aeroplane exceptions. C is wrong because the 1966 Practice Statement applies only to the House of Lords and now the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeal. D is wrong both because it ignores the applicable inconsistency exception and because it misstates per incuriam, which means a decision reached in ignorance of a relevant statute or binding authority, not a misunderstanding of the facts. E is wrong because the Court of Appeal has no general 'interests of justice' power to depart from its own decisions; it may do so only within the recognised exceptions.

Answer: C. Under section 12 of and Schedule 2 to the Legal Services Act 2007, the reserved legal activities are: the exercise of rights of audience, the conduct of litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities, and the administration of oaths. 'Probate activities' means preparing any probate papers — that is, papers on which to found or oppose a grant of probate or a grant of letters of administration (Schedule 2, paragraph 6). By section 14 of the Act, it is a criminal offence to carry on a reserved legal activity without being an authorised person or an exempt person, punishable on conviction on indictment by up to two years' imprisonment and/or a fine. An individual who prepares probate papers otherwise than for, or in expectation of, any fee, gain or reward is an exempt person (Schedule 3, paragraph 4), but the company charges a fixed fee, so no exemption is available — as the facts confirm. Will drafting, by contrast, is not a reserved legal activity: proposals to reserve it, recommended by the Legal Services Board in 2013, were rejected by the Lord Chancellor, so anyone may draft wills commercially without authorisation. The company therefore acts lawfully in drafting wills but commits an offence by preparing probate papers for a fee, making C the best answer.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because will drafting is not a reserved legal activity, so no offence is committed in respect of that service. B is wrong because preparing the papers on which to found a grant of probate is a reserved probate activity, and the company cannot rely on the exemption in Schedule 3 for individuals acting otherwise than for fee, gain or reward, because it charges a fixed fee — so the probate service is unlawful. D is wrong because it inverts the true position — it is the probate work, not the will drafting, that is reserved. E is wrong because a disclaimer of regulation is irrelevant: section 14 criminalises carrying on a reserved legal activity without entitlement regardless of any disclosure made to the customer.

Answer: D. Under the higher-rates regime for additional dwellings (Finance Act 2003, Schedule 4ZA), the surcharge applies where, at the end of the day of the transaction, an individual buyer owns a major interest in more than one dwelling and is not replacing his only or main residence. A purchase only counts as a 'replacement' if the former main residence has already been disposed of. Because the man will still own the Leeds house on the day the York purchase completes, the surcharge is payable on the full purchase price at completion. However, the legislation provides a refund mechanism: if the former main residence is sold within three years of the purchase of the new one, the buyer may reclaim the higher-rates element from HMRC. The correct advice is therefore to pay the surcharge now, budget for it in the completion statement, and submit a repayment claim once the Leeds sale completes, provided that happens within the three-year window.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because intended occupation as a main residence does not prevent the surcharge where the old main residence has not yet been sold; the test is ownership at the end of the day of completion. B is wrong because marketing the old property is irrelevant — only an actual disposal removes the surcharge. C correctly identifies that the surcharge applies but wrongly states it is irrecoverable, ignoring the three-year refund rule. E is wrong because the replacement exception only removes the surcharge, not SDLT altogether, and in any event it is unavailable until the former residence is actually sold.

Answer: B. Under an open contract and under the Standard Conditions of Sale, time is not of the essence of the completion date (SC 6.1.1), so late completion is a breach sounding in damages and contractual compensation but does not of itself entitle the innocent party to terminate. To create a right to terminate, the seller, being ready, able and willing to complete, must serve a notice to complete under SC 6.8. The notice makes time of the essence for both parties, and the buyer must then complete within ten working days, excluding the day on which the notice is given. On receipt of the notice a buyer who paid a reduced deposit must immediately pay the balance needed to bring the deposit up to 10% of the purchase price (SC 6.8.3). If the buyer still fails to complete, SC 7.5 entitles the seller to rescind, forfeit and keep the deposit (with accrued interest) and resell, while also retaining a claim for contractual compensation and damages.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because time is not of the essence under SC 6.1.1, so missing the completion date is not automatically repudiatory. C is wrong on the period (ten working days, not 28) and because on the buyer's default the seller forfeits, rather than returns, the deposit. D is wrong because the notice-to-complete machinery expressly creates a route to termination; compensation for late completion is not the sole remedy. E is wrong because SC 6.8.3 obliges the buyer to top the deposit up to 10% when a notice to complete is served, so the seller's forfeiture is not capped at the 5% paid on exchange.

Answer: C. Sections 2 and 27 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provide that a conveyance to a purchaser overreaches equitable interests under a trust of land where the capital money is paid to at least two trustees (or a trust corporation). Here the purchase money was paid to both registered proprietors, so the statutory conditions were satisfied and the mother's beneficial interest was swept off the land and attached instead to the proceeds of sale in the brothers' hands. City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54 establishes that actual occupation cannot save an interest that has been overreached: Schedule 3, paragraph 2 of the Land Registration Act 2002 can only elevate a subsisting proprietary interest, and after overreaching the occupier has no interest in the land left to override. The mother's remedy lies against her sons for her share of the proceeds, not against the buyer. Had there been only one registered proprietor receiving the money (as in Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland), the outcome would have been different.

Why the other options are wrong: A ignores overreaching: occupation only protects an interest that still subsists in the land, and this one no longer did at registration. B is wrong because a purchaser's failure to enquire is only relevant where the interest survives; enquiries could not have preserved an interest destroyed by payment to two trustees. D overstates the law — a trust interest can bind a purchaser via actual occupation where money is paid to a sole trustee (Boland). E gives the wrong reason: an interest under a trust of land cannot be protected by notice at all (s.33 LRA 2002); the interest fails because of overreaching, not want of registration.

Answer: C. Section 36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 permits a joint tenant to sever the equitable joint tenancy unilaterally by giving written notice to the other joint tenant; no consent, signature or response from the recipient is required. By s.196(3) of the same Act, a notice is sufficiently served if it is left at the last-known place of abode of the person to be served, and the authorities (Re 88 Berkeley Road; Kinch v Bullard) confirm that service is complete on delivery — it does not matter that the recipient never read the letter. The notice was therefore effective on Tuesday morning, when it came through the letterbox, and from that moment the two owners held the equitable interest as tenants in common in equal shares. When the man died that evening there was no right of survivorship in equity: his half share formed part of his estate and passes under his will to his sister, with the woman remaining sole legal owner holding on trust for herself and the sister equally.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because s.196(3) makes delivery to the last-known abode sufficient service; actual reading is unnecessary. B is wrong because severance by written notice under s.36(2) is a unilateral act — mutual agreement is only one alternative method of severance. D is wrong because a will cannot sever a joint tenancy: severance must occur during the joint tenants' joint lives, and but for the notice the gift would have failed to survivorship. E is wrong because severance produced a tenancy in common in equal shares, so the estate takes only the man's half, not the whole house.

Answer: C. Under section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 (as substituted), the will is validly executed: the testatrix signed intending to give effect to the will in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time, and each witness then attested in her presence. Section 15 of the Wills Act 1837 then operates on the gift, not on the will: a beneficial gift to an attesting witness, or to the spouse or civil partner of an attesting witness (married or in the partnership at the time of attestation), is void, but the witness's attestation remains good and the will stands. Sarah was Daniel's wife when she attested, so the £20,000 legacy to Daniel is void. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1968 disapplies section 15 only where the will is duly executed without counting the tainted attestation, which requires at least two other untainted witnesses; here there was only one other witness, so the saving cannot apply. A failed pecuniary legacy falls into residue, so the £20,000 passes to the daughter under the residuary gift.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because section 15 voids the gift only; the witness remains competent and the will is validly executed, so there is no intestacy. B is wrong because section 15 expressly extends to gifts to the spouse or civil partner of an attesting witness, not just to the witness personally. D is wrong because a lapsed or void pecuniary legacy does not pass on intestacy where there is an effective residuary gift; it simply swells residue. E is wrong because the Wills Act 1968 saving only applies where, ignoring the beneficiary-linked witness, there remain at least two other attesting witnesses, and here there was only one.

Answer: B. Property held as beneficial joint tenants passes automatically to the surviving joint tenant by survivorship and never forms part of the estate distributed under the intestacy rules, so the wife takes the home outright. The distribution of the net intestate estate is governed by section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (as amended by the Inheritance and Trustees' Powers Act 2014). Where the intestate leaves a spouse (who survives 28 days) and issue, the spouse takes the personal chattels absolutely, the fixed net sum (£322,000 for deaths on or after 26 July 2023) with interest, and one half of any residue absolutely; the issue take the other half on the statutory trusts. Here the residue after the chattels and statutory legacy is £522,000 − £322,000 = £200,000, so the wife takes £100,000 absolutely and the two adult children (who have satisfied the statutory-trust contingency of reaching 18) share £100,000 equally, £50,000 each.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the spouse takes the whole estate only where the intestate leaves no issue; the existence of children, whoever their other parent is, triggers the shared distribution. C is wrong because the spouse's life interest in half the residue was abolished for deaths on or after 1 October 2014 by the Inheritance and Trustees' Powers Act 2014; the spouse now takes her half absolutely. D is wrong because a beneficial joint tenant's interest passes by survivorship and does not devolve on the personal representatives or fall into the intestate estate. E is wrong because it gives the spouse no share of the residue, when she is entitled to half of it absolutely in addition to the chattels and statutory legacy.

Answer: C. A direction to divide a fund in equal shares among a class is a fixed trust: every beneficiary's share depends on knowing the total number of beneficiaries. The test for certainty of objects of a fixed trust is the "complete list" test from IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955]: it must be possible to draw up a comprehensive list of every beneficiary. That requires both conceptual certainty (a workable definition of the class) and the practical ability to identify all members. "Old friends" is the classic example of conceptual uncertainty — there is no objective criterion by which the courts or trustees can determine degrees of friendship — so no complete list can ever be compiled and the trust fails for uncertainty of objects. Trustees never take beneficially on failure; because equity abhors a beneficial vacuum, the £150,000 is held on resulting trust for the testator's estate, and since the failure occurs under the will it falls into residue and passes to the niece.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the "is or is not" (any given postulant) test from McPhail v Doulton applies to discretionary trusts and powers, not to fixed trusts, and in any event conceptual uncertainty defeats even that test. B is wrong because Re Barlow's Will Trusts concerned a series of individual gifts subject to a condition precedent (options to buy paintings), where only the claimant need prove they qualify; it does not validate a trust requiring division among the whole class. D is wrong because trustees hold on trust and can never keep the fund for themselves when the trust fails; a resulting trust arises. E is wrong because no opinion clause was included, and a trustee's opinion cannot cure conceptual uncertainty in the class definition itself.

Answer: B. Where a trustee mixes trust money with his own in a bank account, the beneficiaries may trace into the mixture and into assets bought from it. The presumption in Re Hallett's Estate (1880) — that the wrongdoing trustee spends his own money first — exists to protect beneficiaries; it cannot be turned against them. Under Re Oatway [1903], where the trustee buys an asset from the mixed fund and then dissipates the balance, the beneficiaries may elect to attribute the purchase to the trust money and assert a proprietary claim (a charge or beneficial interest) over the surviving asset. Here the £40,000 purchase can be treated as made with trust money, giving the beneficiaries a proprietary claim to the shares, now worth £36,000. Because a proprietary claim attaches to specific property, it survives the trustee's bankruptcy and takes priority over unsecured creditors (Foskett v McKeown [2001]). The £20,000 spent on the holiday is dissipated and cannot be traced, so for the £14,000 shortfall the beneficiaries have a personal claim for breach of trust, provable as an unsecured debt.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because the Re Hallett presumption operates in the beneficiaries' favour and, where the remaining balance has been dissipated, Re Oatway lets them attribute the purchase to trust money rather than the trustee's own. C is wrong because mixing does not defeat equitable tracing against a trustee; the mixture is treated as charged with the trust's claim. D is wrong because Clayton's Case (first in, first out) is, at most, applied between competing innocent contributors to a mixed account, not as between a defaulting trustee and his beneficiaries. E is wrong because there is no such election: beneficiaries may take the traceable asset and also pursue a personal claim for any remaining loss, though they cannot recover more than their total loss overall.

Answer: B. Self-defence is governed by the common law as clarified by section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The defendant is judged on the facts as he genuinely believed them to be, and an honest belief need not be reasonable (s 76(3)-(4), codifying R v Gladstone Williams). However, section 76(5) provides that a defendant may not rely on any mistaken belief attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced, confirming the common law position in R v O'Grady and R v Hatton. Jake's belief that Tom was about to stab him arose from his drunken state, so he cannot rely on it and self-defence fails. Nor can intoxication assist him on mens rea: assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a basic intent offence, and under DPP v Majewski voluntary intoxication is no answer to a basic intent charge. A borderline candidate who remembers only the generous Gladstone Williams rule, without the intoxication carve-out, will wrongly choose option A.

Why the other options are wrong: A states the general rule but ignores the express exception in s 76(5) for drink-induced mistakes, which is decisive here. C is wrong because the defence does not require the mistake to be reasonable; the belief fails only because it was drink-induced, not because it was unreasonable. D is wrong because section 47 is a basic intent offence, so under Majewski voluntary intoxication cannot negate the mens rea. E is wrong because force is normally assessed against the facts as the defendant believed them, not the true facts; it also wrongly implies the defence remains open to Jake.

Answer: B. Under section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and Code C, a detainee's right to consult a solicitor privately may be delayed only where: the person is detained for an indictable offence (which includes either-way offences such as burglary); an officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorises the delay; and that officer has reasonable grounds to believe that exercising the right will lead to interference with or harm to evidence or persons, the alerting of other suspects, or hinder the recovery of property obtained through the offence (s 58(6)-(8)). Even where properly authorised, the delay cannot extend beyond 36 hours from the relevant time (s 58(5)), and the detainee must be told the reason, which must be recorded. Here two independent defects make the authorisation unlawful: it was given by an inspector, not a superintendent, and it purported to run for 48 hours. This is a classic trap because an inspector can authorise the separate, less intrusive delay of the right to have someone informed of arrest under section 56.

Why the other options are wrong: A confuses the ranks: an inspector may authorise delay of the section 56 right to have someone informed, but only a superintendent or above may delay legal advice under section 58. C overstates the position; the right can be delayed in the narrow section 58 circumstances, so it is not absolute. D states the wrong maximum (it is 36 hours, not 24) and wrongly treats the inspector's authorisation as valid. E misunderstands 'indictable offence', which for PACE purposes includes either-way offences such as burglary, so the offence type was not the problem.

Answer: B. Under rule 2.1 of the SRA Accounts Rules 2019, client money includes money held or received on account of costs and unpaid disbursements only if received before delivery of a bill for them. The £1,800 relates to a bill already delivered covering profit costs and paid disbursements, so it is business money. The £5,000 for Stamp Duty Land Tax is money received in respect of an unbilled, unpaid disbursement to be made on the client's behalf, so it is client money (rule 2.1(a) and (d)). The payment is therefore a mixed receipt, and rule 4.2 requires only that the firm 'allocate promptly any funds from mixed payments... to the correct client account or business account'. Unlike the pre-2019 rules, the 2019 Rules do not prescribe which account the mixed sum must enter first or fix a 14-day deadline: the firm may bank the whole sum in either account, provided the misplaced element is moved promptly. Option B alone captures this flexibility accurately.

Why the other options are wrong: A imports the old, pre-2019 approach; the current rules do not require the sum to enter the client account first, nor do they impose a 14-day transfer period. C is wrong because money paid against a delivered bill for costs and paid disbursements is business money regardless of the stage the matter has reached. D is wrong because mixed receipts are expressly contemplated by rule 4.2; there is no obligation to reject them. E is wrong because the £5,000 is client money and cannot simply be left in the business account, as that would breach rules 2.3 and 4.2 and amount to improper use of client money.

Answer: B. Paragraph 1.3 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors requires a solicitor to perform all undertakings given, within an agreed timescale or otherwise within a reasonable time. An undertaking is a statement, made by or on behalf of the solicitor or firm, to someone who reasonably places reliance on it, that the giver will do or cause to be done something. Once given and relied upon, it binds the solicitor personally and the firm, irrespective of the client's wishes: the client's instruction not to pay, and the fact that the firm holds no funds, are no answer. This is precisely why solicitors are trained never to undertake to do something outside their own control, or to pay money they do not hold; having done so, Sofia and the firm must find the £12,000 and perform within the five working days. Breach is serious professional misconduct enforceable by the SRA, and the court also has a supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors' undertakings (see Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd). Release can come only from the recipient, the buyer's solicitors.

Why the other options are wrong: A is wrong because an undertaking given in the course of practice binds the solicitor personally; the client cannot revoke it by withdrawing instructions. C is wrong because undertakings given by any solicitor or employee in the course of practice bind both the giver and the firm; partnership status is irrelevant. D is wrong because an undertaking's professional force does not depend on contractual consideration or a deed; it is enforceable as a matter of professional conduct and the court's supervisory jurisdiction. E is wrong because a solicitor cannot unilaterally withdraw an undertaking that has been relied upon; lack of funds does not make performance impossible, merely expensive for the firm.